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Abstract. This note discusses Watson and Holmes (2016) and their pro-
posals towards more robust Bayesian decisions. While we acknowledge
and commend the authors for setting new and all-encompassing prin-
ciples of Bayesian robustness, and we appreciate the strong anchoring
of those within a decision-theoretic referential, we remain uncertain
as to which extent such principles can be applied outside binary de-
cisions. We also wonder at the ultimate relevance of Kullback-Leibler
neighbourhoods to characterise robustness and favour extensions along
non-parametric axes.
Key words and phrases: decision-theory, prior selection, robust method-
ology, misspecification.
1. INTRODUCTION: THERE IS NOTHING LIKE FIRST-HAND
EVIDENCE
The most sensitive aspect of both Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistics cer-
tainly is the reliance on a probabilistic model since even Bayesian non-parametrics
relies on a highly concentrated modelling in a functional space. Considering the
issue of misspecification from within Bayesian analysis is therefore a major un-
dertaking that has been curiously overlooked in the past, to the point that it
shows up in negative like a missing link in the field. Assessing the goodness of
fit of a given model or exploring the consequences of working with a misspec-
ified model have been little studied so far and there certainly is no theoretical
or methodological corpus that can be acknowledged as a reference. Bayesian ro-
bustness definitely was a keyword in the 80’s (Berger et al., 1996) but the field
somewhat dwindled along the year, presumably overtaken [as already pointed out
by the authors] by the MCMC tsunami that allowed for much more ambitious
modelling and the incorporation of higher variability through hierarchical struc-
tures and priors (Cappe´ and Robert, 2000; Robert and Casella, 2010), although
this may constitute a wishful reinterpretation of the past. Another possible rea-
son is that the complex mathematics involved in the formal representation of the
robustness desiderata quickly got intractable. In any case, Bayesian robustness
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2was mostly concerned with reducing the impact of the prior modelling, i.e., it
was understood in terms of robustness against the prior rather than against the
model. (A different approach is adopted in Samaniego, 2010, who considers a
second type of priors intended to assess the performances of the original priors,
with limited applicability.)
In this paper, the authors aim at providing robust inference against possible
misspecifications of the sampling model also, producing empirical and method-
ological perspectives on the issue. This attempt is most commendable and we
hope it will induce others to enlarge and deepen the work in this direction. In
particular, we think there is some degree of urgency in solving the conundrum
of the major “Big Data” challenge, namely the impossible derivation of a com-
plete statistical model with high dimension or complex data structures (which
differs from the “tall data” case where the sheer size of the data hinders standard
algorithms, see, e.g., Bardenet et al., 2014). We like very much the idea that ro-
bustness should be targeted to a specific decision and thus firmly set within a
decision-theoretic framework. The paper starts with a refreshingly modern review
on robustness in this context and then advances two types of propositions towards
evaluating robustness of Bayesian procedures and possibly proposing a more ro-
bust procedure. However, we find the empirical assessment that results from the
approach somewhat too tentative and too inconclusive to provide a guidance to
practitioners. It indeed appears that expanding the framework beside binary de-
cisions faces considerable difficulties. We thus suggest below that more (involved)
non-parametric procedures should be developed towards this goal. In our opinion,
one of the most challenging foundations of the paper is the involvement of the
action a in the construction of the reference prior, which does not appear natural
or acceptable to us, because the coherence of the Bayesian perspective does not
seem to transfer to this approach.
2. GAME OF THORNS: DUALITY BETWEEN POSTERIOR AND LOSS
FUNCTION
First, we want to point out that, in the specific and important setting of discrete
decision spaces, and in particular for binary decisions, the propositions of the
authors make a lot of sense. We are thus genuinely curious as to how these ideas
could extent to infinite and continuous decision spaces. While we are similarly
strongly inclined towards a decision-theoretic approach to statistics and hence
definitely sympathetic to the perspective adopted in the paper, we also think one
should keep in mind the unfortunately ignored remark by Herman Rubin (Rubin,
1987) that model densities and loss functions are only utilised through the product
prior x likelihood x loss in Bayesian decision theory. Hence, in this sense, prior and
loss are indistinguishable beyond this product. This reference is meant to support
the point that both sampling and prior densities and losses should be assessed via
a robustness filter, rather than solely examining the prior x likelihoo x loss term
under the robustness magnifying glass. There exist rationality arguments and
the like about the choice of a loss function (Raiffa, 1968; DeGroot, 1970; Berger,
1985), but since most parameters are a by-product [of possibly strong relevance]
of defining a model, rather than enjoying an existence of their own, it is difficult
not to think of the loss function as being linked to the model (mis-)specification.
In particular, this is why we do not see how “changing the likelihood changes
imsart-sts ver. 2009/02/27 file: Watsolmes.tex date: September 25, 2018
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the interpretation of the prior” (p.6) is such a “thorny issue” (p.6). The notion
of loss robustness is only alluded to in the conclusion of the paper and we hope
it can be considered much further in parallel with the current assessment of the
model. Obviously there is no free lunch and it is necessary to accept some of
the hypotheses to be able to give meaningful conclusions. Our point is that the
approaches seem to make a lot of sense for decisions belonging to a finite space,
but may be less so or at least not so obvious sense in continuous cases.
3. THE BAKER STREET IRREGULARS : ARE KULLBACK-LEIBLER
NEIGHBOURHOODS A PERTINENT CHOICE TO ASSESS
ROBUSTNESS?
The authors build and study semi-local measures of robustness, in the sense
that the impact of the decision is evaluated on a neighbourhood of the pos-
terior distribution. As nicely reviewed in their Section 2, this idea is not new
and Kullback-Leibler neighbourhoods had already been considered in a series of
papers. The key justification in the present paper, for Kullback-Leibler neigh-
bourhoods is in Theorem 4.2, where some notion of coherency is invoked.
The authors build their approach from three principles. It is hard to disagree
with these three principles laid out for D-open methods. However their approach
based on the Kullback-Leibler neighbourhoods raises a few issues. The result
produced in Theorem 4.1 indicates that the least favourable prior involves the
exponential of the loss: this is not surprising given earlier works by the authors
like Bissiri et al. (2013). What sounds rather confusing while being central to the
theme of the paper is the fact that each possible action a induces a different
prior or rather distribution in the parameter space. To understand this peculiar
incorporation of the decision a in the least favourable model (or in posterior
distribution) means that the least favourable decision is twice a posteriori: it is
indeed an update after both having observed the data and taken an action a. This
proposal makes complete sense when evaluating the action, but it gets difficult to
understand its meaning when proposing a new action. In other words, it seems to
run against the grain of Bayesian principles. The persistence of the indexing in a
of the notions and notations throughout the paper thus remains quite puzzling to
us. (Similar puzzlement is attached with the impact of the Monte Carlo variability
on the final decision, as discussed in Section 4.3.)
Besides, the least favourable posteriors only enjoy an implicit expression since
the Lagrange multiplier λa(C) are non explicit and it is difficult to understand
how they behave with a and C.
More puzzling even is the fact that if the posterior distribution is extremely
concentrated, as would happen in the context of large data sets, the Kullback-
Leibler neighbourhood, for a fixed radius C, will be very small giving a (probably)
fake impression of robustness. To illustrate this, consider the case where the pos-
terior distribution is close to N (θˆ, v/n) with n large (in other words the posterior
distribution verifies a Bernstein-von Mises theorem). To understand the impact
on λa(C) consider also the case where La(θ) = (a− θ)2. Then pisupa,C ≈ N (µn, vn)
with µn = (θˆn/v − 2λa(C)a)/(n/v − 2λa(C)) and vn = (n/v − 2λa(C))−1 and it
is easy to see that when
√
n|a− θˆ| ≫ 1,
λa(C) ≈
√
nC
2
|a− θˆ|−1
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4while if a = θˆ , λa(C) ≈
√
Cn/v. In the latter case
ψ
sup
(a) (C) ≈
v
n
(1− u)−1 , 2C = u
1− u + log(1− u)
while in the former case,
ψ
sup
(a) (C) ≈
( v
n
+ (a− θˆ)2
)1 +
√
2Cv√
n|a− θˆ|
(
1−
√
2Cv√
n|a− θˆ|
)
−1


and the difference between ψ
sup
(a) (C) and ψ
inf
(a) (C) is of the same order as the risk
under piI when a = θˆ and is of smaller order than the risk when a 6= θˆ. Unless
C becomes quite large, the decision a that minimises ψ
sup
(a) (C) is approximately
θˆ. This behaviour does suggest that the posterior leads to a robust inference,
while it could well be that the model is strongly mis-specified. Such a difficulty
appears to be a consequence of using Kullback-Leibler neighbourhoods since L1
neighbourhoods might have led to a different behaviour, although this is far from
certain.
This naturally drives us to question the relevance of the coherence require-
ment of Theorem 4.2. While the coherence requirement was quite natural in
Bissiri et al. (2013), towards building the likelihood, here it is unclear why the
same result should be obtained directly or after having first observed a subset of
observations x(1) and constructed a least favourable prior pi
sup
a,C (x(1), a), prior to
observing the rest of the observations. We feel that pi
sup
a,C (x, a) solely exists after
observing x and that it solely makes sense in this very context. We cannot fathom
an equivalent to this result in standard decision-theoretical point estimation. This
is presumably due to the fact that, for a continuum of actions, there is not much
appeal in considering a continuum of priors. It is however difficult to evaluate the
relevance or importance of this coherence constraint. Once again, generalising to
a continuous action space seems delicate without further guidance. 1
The advantage of using the Kullback-Leibler divergence is that it is mathemati-
cally convenient up to a certain point, but it does not necessarily make sense from
a statistical viewpoint: e.g., is there a model likelihood and a prior associated with
every single distribution contained within this neighbourhood? Presumably so,
given that this only has to hold for a fixed value of the sample x. And is the least
favourable distribution a true posterior for all samples x? Presumably not, unless
one accepts “data-dependent priors”. It may prove to be the most delicate aspect
of the paper, namely that the calibration of the evaluation is highly dependent
on how far from the reference value we allow the posteriors to drift and that we
have no clear idea of the meaning of the resulting neighbourhood at the end of
Section 4.1. It seems to us that one of the reasons it is so difficult to calibrate
C is that Kullback-Leibler neighbourhoods are rather abstract objects. Thus one
cannot resort to intuition or subjective knowledge in the calibration process. The
discussion by the authors in the conclusion of this paper broaches upon this very
point. In some specific settings, it should be possible to create neighbourhoods by
1 Note also that the case when the decision a is the parameter θ itself or rather its estimate
θˆ as in Section 4.2 remains a puzzle to us as the notation θ in this section seems to be used with
this double meaning, which makes the outcome questionable.
imsart-sts ver. 2009/02/27 file: Watsolmes.tex date: September 25, 2018
DISCUSSION OF APPROXIMATE MODELS AND ROBUST DECISIONS 5
looking at some quantity of interest and setting bounds or limits on the posterior
values or variability for this quantity. An alternative would be to resort to an
ABC (Marin et al., 2011) type of robustness where only posteriors that have the
ability to predict the actual data (or the original optimal decision) are allowed
within the corresponding neighbourhood. While this approach is only vaguely
defined, and may be delicate to implement in practice, it carries a most natural
kind of proximity.
As a side remark, we appreciate the notion of evaluating the impact of single
observations on the inference, as it creates a decision-based outlier and leverage
assessment perspective, but we remain unsure as to what one can conclude about
the appropriateness of the model from the divergence measure, the more because
it looks terribly similar to an harmonic mean estimator (Chopin and Robert,
2007)!
In connection with this remark, and even before we reached the short section
4.2.3, the introduction of Ω-admissible actions reminded us of Γ-minimax proce-
dures mostly studied in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. This notion did not attract
a large flock of followers at the time, because it is quite delicate to figure out
whether or not a procedure is Γ-minimax. However, once we read Section 4.2.3,
we got somewhat confused as we could not see how the action enters the choice of
the minimax prior. Nor why it should.2 Clearly, Ω-admissibility as defined here
is a much more convoluted notion that not only involves the range of accept-
able priors but also a new least favourable prior and the optimal decision under
the original prior, which somewhat constitutes the centre of the Kullback-Leibler
ball.3 The various proposals of Section 4.2 highlight the links between the pro-
posed approach and other proposals for robust inference, but they also suggest
that the calibration of C can only be achieved on a case by case basis.
4. TURNING TO NON-PARAMETRIC BRICKS
The non-parametric approach via (e.g.) Dirichlet priors is somewhat of an
expected if welcomed thread. For one thing, it sounds more genuine for inferen-
tial purposes, when compared with the call to Kullback-Leibler neighbourhoods.
This is particularly compelling when considering a candidate posterior as the
functional parameter of the Dirichlet (hyper) prior—although the denomination
of “prior” clashes with the fact that the Dirichlet process is centred at the poste-
rior piI—. Looking at the variability or distribution of the loss under a Dirichlet
process centred at the posterior distribution constitutes quite an interesting and
elegant proposal, but we wonder about the type of neighbourhoods of the poste-
rior distributions thus induced. (We also appreciate the Monte Carlo convenience
offered by the Dirichlet process representation described in Section 4.3.1)
How do these ”neighbourhoods” compare to the Kullback-Leibler neighbour-
hoods of the first part?
2We note that the current paper somewhat extends the original Γ-minimax problem by con-
sidering a collection of posterior rather than priors. While this makes complete sense from a con-
ditioning perspective, it does not necessarily lead to coherent answers since the least favourable
priors are then data dependent.
3In computational terms, using the centre of the ball for importance sampling [p.17] may
be fraught with danger as the Kullback proximity does not guarantee tail behaviour and hence
finite variance. Hence, using the importance weights to calibrate the Kullback neighbourhood
cannot be suggested without further assessment.
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6Indeed Bayesian non-parametrics suffer from the drawback that functional pri-
ors are almost irremediably concentrated on very small regions of the functional
space and thus do not necessarily reflect much of a range of possible posteriors.
Obviously, in a nonparametric framework, the notion of neighbourhood is much
more loose than in the parametric case. One can envision them as soft versus hard
neighbourhoods by analogy to soft versus hard thresholding. While the authors
state in Section 4.3.2 that an action optimal under the functional parameter of
the Dirichlet prior will remain optimal (in expectation) under the random mea-
sure distributed from this Dirichlet, this may constitute a second-tier property
in that it only stands in expectation.
We find the proposition of studying the probability of changing the optimal
decision particularly relevant, in particular in the context of discrete and finite
decision spaces. In fact, we are not quite sure of what happens or would happen in
the context of continuous decisions. Indeed, in this latter case, La(θ) also follows a
Dirichlet process centred at the posterior distribution of La(θ). Hence, if qτ is the
τ -th quantile of La(θ) under the posterior piI , then Q(La(θ) ≤ qτ ) ∼ Beta(α(1 −
τ), ατ), which depends only on τ and on the mass of the Dirichlet process α.
There is no dependence whatsoever on piI , which seems to imply it presents
little interest. Thus, we wonder which relevant quantities could be produced in
continuous settings towards a better understanding of the variability of the loss
function under deviations from the posterior.
5. CONCLUSION: THE GAME IS AFOOT!
While the authors have already uncovered several interesting new avenues for
exploring Bayesian robustness, we want to point out yet another avenue as-
sociated with the notion of penalised complexity (PC) priors, as proposed by
Simpson et al. (2014), In fact, we think penalised complexity is eminently rele-
vant to the robustness issue as this perspective tackles the prior specification side
covered in Section 2.2. The starting point for Simpson et al. (2014) modelling is
a base model, out of which possibly robust extensions can be constructed. While
there is no automated derivation of the base model, it corresponds to the op-
erational model mentioned in the current paper. Simpson et al. (2014) further
rely on a functional distance from the base and make the quite natural proposal
of setting a prior on the distance from the base. Although there is no decision-
theoretic aspect to be found in this proposal, an extension in this direction is
certainly feasible.
In conclusion, we commend the authors for this foray into Bayesian robustess
and for producing such a novel perspective. Formalising this aspect of Bayesian
analysis is absolutely essential for methodological and practical purposes, even
when not required by foundational arguments. We also recognise that the pro-
posals made in the paper are mostly exploratory, rather than directive, primarily
aiming at representing the variability of the Bayesian output when some of its
components are uncertain or misspecified. Once again, this represents an impor-
tant step in the rational and objective evaluation of Bayesian procedures and we
congratulate the authors for initiating such a path. Some of the proposals made
therein may require further investigation in terms of Bayesian coherence, but
they open a different perspective on how to envision Bayesian decision making
from a braoder viewpoint.
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